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Malia b s t r a c t
Mali, a vast landlocked country at the heart of West Africa in the Sahel region, is one of the least devel-
oped and most food insecure countries in the world. Mali suffered from a series of political, constitutional
and military crises since January 2012, including the loss of government control of northern territories
from April 2012 until January 2013. A range of humanitarian aid interventions were scaled up in response
to these complex crises. In this study, we exploit data from a unique pre-crisis baseline to evaluate the
impact of humanitarian aid on the food security of rural populations. We design a quasi-experimental
study based on two survey rounds, five years apart, in the Mopti region in Northern Mali. Data was col-
lected from 66 communities randomly selected from within food-insecure districts. Study outcomes
include household expenditures and food consumption and a proxy for child nutritional status (height
measurements). We estimate program impact by combining propensity score matching and difference-
in-difference. Food assistance was found to increase household non-food and food expenditures and
micro-nutrient availability. Disaggregating by degree of conflict exposure showed that the effects on chil-
dren’s height and caloric and micro-nutrient consumption were mostly concentrated in areas not in the
immediate vicinity of the conflict, unlike the increase in food expenditures that were driven by house-
holds located in close proximity to armed groups. The effects were also concentrated on households
receiving at least two forms of food assistance. In villages where armed groups were present, food assis-
tance improved household zinc consumption and also appeared to support food expenditures. Food
transfers are thus found to exert a protective effect among food insecure population in conflict context.
 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
An estimated 700 million people live in extreme poverty (World
Bank, 2016). Undernutrition affects 800 million people globally,
with the vast majority of undernourished people living in low-
and middle-income countries (FAO, IFAD, & WFP, 2015). Despite
recent progress, undernutrition causes over three million child
deaths per year and stunting prevalence in children under 5 affects
at least 165 million children (Black et al., 2013).
Conflict and political instability are important drivers of under-
nutrition. Out of the six emergency situations currently listed onthe World Food Programme website, five (Iraq, Lake Chad Basin,
South Sudan, Syria and Yemen) are directly the result of conflict.
Depriving populations from access to food is often an explicit
war tactics. Armed conflicts are also responsible for weakening
food production and health systems, and for undermining the func-
tioning of markets and institutions (Justino, 2012). Armed conflicts
have been found to profoundly impact mortality, morbidity and
malnutrition, among other health outcomes (Altare & Guha Sapir,
2013). Children exposed to violent conflict at an early age or in
utero are found to be more likely to suffer fromModerate or Severe
Acute Malnutrition (MAM/SAM), even controlling for household
backgrounds and non-randomness of conflict location (Alderman,
Hoddinott, & Kinsey, 2006; Camacho, 2008; Akresh, Bhalotra,quasi-
2 J.-P. Tranchant et al. /World Development xxx (2018) xxx–xxxLeone, & Osili, 2012; Domingues & Barre, 2013; Minoiu &
Shemyakina, 2014).
The identification of the mechanisms linking conflict exposure
to mortality, morbidity and malnutrition, however, remains elu-
sive. Only an estimated 20% of excess mortality stems from direct
deaths due to warfare violence (Altare & Guha Sapir, 2013) and
while the literature has identified several potential mechanisms
underlying the impact of conflict, more systematic evidence is
needed, especially in contexts of low to moderately violent con-
flicts. Conflicts of low to moderate intensity, which do not kill a
substantial number of civilians, can still be responsible for catas-
trophic increases in undernutrition. Tranchant, Justino, and
Mueller (2014) show that populations living in the shadow of the
Naxal insurgency in India do not directly suffer on the long run
from the conflict. However, they are unable to cope with income
shocks (such as droughts and illness) because of the restriction in
mobility due to the conflict, and because of the absence of the state
and NGOs. Droughts and illnesses in this environment result in a
catastrophic increase in odds of stunting for young children.
Delivering timely and adequate food assistance to conflict-
affected populations is therefore critical to avoid increases in the
prevalence of acute malnutrition. Yet, it is challenging for aid
actors to reach these populations due to a variety of logistical chal-
lenges and because it often means taking siding with conflict
actors. Little is known as to the effectiveness of aid in conflict areas
to guide program design and implementation. While there exists
some evidence of the effectiveness of the type of safety net inter-
ventions WFP implemented in Mali in 2012–2013, this evidence
usually comes from non-emergency, non-conflict contexts. Safety
nets, involving either cash or in-kind transfers, are estimated to
reach 1.3 billion people globally (Honorati, Gentilini, & Yemtsov,
2015). Safety nets program designs are heterogeneous, with impor-
tant differences in targeting, transfer modality, size and distribu-
tion frequency. There is growing evidence that safety net
transfers increase food consumption, improving the quantity and
quality of food consumed by poor households (Hidrobo,
Hoddinott, Kumar, & Olivier, 2018; Ruel, Alderman, & Maternal &
Child Nutrition Study Group, 2013). Reviews also highlight that
the potential of safety nets to improve nutrition has been to date
largely untapped (Ruel et al., 2013).
Moreover, there is a dearth of evidence from rigorous studies on
the effectiveness of any type of humanitarian aid during conflict.
Rossi, Hoerz, Thouvenot, Pastore, and Michael (2006) investigate
health, nutrition and food security programs in a complex emer-
gency, Willibald (2006) and Haider (2011) discuss cash transfers
in a conflict setting and Bozzoli, Bruck, and Wald (2013) provide
a framework for evaluations in conflict settings, but rigorous eval-
uations tend to focus on peace promotion and conflict resolution
initiatives; on interventions to mitigate the psychological costs of
exposed populations and former (child) soldiers; or on develop-
ment programs in post-conflict settings (Fearon, Humphreys, &
Weinstein, 2009; Casey, Glennerster, & Miguel, 2012). This study
contributes to filling this gap by generating evidence of the effec-
tiveness of WFP’s food assistance interventions in conflict-
affected areas of Mali. In so doing we also add to review articles
looking at how nutrition programs could be designed to best work
in emergency settings (Harvey, Proudlock, Clay, Riley, & Jaspars,
2010; Webb et al., 2014).
We exploit data from a unique pre-crisis household survey to
evaluate the impact of humanitarian aid on the food security of
rural populations in Mali. This baseline survey, collected in January
2012, provided extensive demographic, economic, consumption, or
anthropometric information (among others) prior to the outbreak
of the conflict on 1,500 households in 66 villages of Mopti region
as well as information from teachers and village chiefs. We
returned to these same communities and collected a second wavePlease cite this article in press as: Tranchant, J.-P., et al. The impact of food assis
experiment in Mali. World Development (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worldof the household survey in January 2017. In addition to the initial
set of questions, the endline survey also included detailed modules
on availability of and access to humanitarian aid as well as conflict
exposure and presence of armed groups over the last five years.
This unique panel dataset allows us to ascertain whether aid pro-
vision enabled households to better cope with the effects of the
political crisis and insecurity, and whether proximity to the con-
flict influenced the effectiveness of aid.
Specifically, we estimate with matched difference-in-difference
whether access to different forms of food assistance improved
household (food) expenditures, food and nutrient consumption,
and long-term nutrition status of children (as captured by changes
in height). The existence of baseline data allows us to match ‘‘treat-
ment” households with comparable ‘‘control” households,
strengthening the internal validity of the study. The estimations
reveal that access to food assistance increases non-food and food
expenditures, as well as intake of calorie, protein, iron, zinc and
vitamin A. Disaggregating by degree of conflict exposure shows
that the increased food consumption is mostly concentrated in
areas indirectly affected by the conflict, but that the increase in
food expenditures is mostly driven by households located near
the armed groups. Food assistance also improved children’ growth
in villages indirectly affected by the conflict. The analysis also pre-
sents evidence on factors that influenced the effectiveness of the
transfers.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we provide an
overview of the context in Mali, paying special attention to how
aid and conflict were distributed among the study population. In
Section 3 we then describe the methods and data. Study findings
are presented in Sections 4 and 5; and finally Section 6 discusses
implications for program design.2. Context
Mali is a west-African country of 14 million people classified as
a low-income food deficit country by the FAO. In 2016, Mali ranked
175th out of 188 countries by the UNDP human development
index, with an average life expectancy at birth of 58 years, an aver-
age of two years of schooling per person and an annual per capita
gross national product of $853. Agricultural productivity is among
the lowest in the world and most farmers produce subsistence
crops, particularly millet and sorghum using a primitive technol-
ogy (USDA, 2009). Production is carried out using a low level of
technology: fertilizer use is minimal and access to credit is limited.
Crop yields are not only low but also highly variable due to the fact
that most farmers depend on rainfed farming while rainfall
fluctuates considerably from year to year and season to season
(USDA, 2009). The WFP estimates (WFP Mali, 2016) that 24% of
the population is chronically food insecure. DHS data collected in
2012–13 report that 38% of children are chronically malnourished
(stunted), 13% are acutely malnourished (wasted) and 26% are
underweight.2.1. Conflict in Mali
Since the independence of Mali, there have been four waves of
Tuareg rebellions in the north of the country, in 1962, 1990, 2006
and 2010. Persistent feelings of marginalization among the Tuar-
egs, combined with widespread droughts in the 1970s and the
1980s, and the general failure of the regimes of Modibo Keita (until
1968) and Moussa Traoré (between 1968 and 1991) to address core
grievances of Tuaregs are widely thought to explain the renewal of
the rebellion since 1990 (Lecoq, 2010). On April 10, 1992 a
‘‘National Pact” was signed between the transitional authorities
and the Tuareg insurgents. The belligerents agreed on a cease fire,tance on food insecure populations during conflict: Evidence from a quasi-
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autonomy through decentralization.
Despite a strong commitment towards decentralization and
democratization from President Konaré in the 1990s (Schraeder,
2011), feelings of frustration with the lack of progress in the imple-
mentation of the National Pact and continuous marginalization of
the north grew. In May 2006, the Tuareg rebellion resumed. The
then president Amadou Toumani Touré negotiated with the rebels
and the Algiers accords were signed that same year. Core
grievances of the Tuaregs were still not addressed though, and
in 2010 the MNLA (Mouvement National pour la Libération de
l’Azawad) was founded, partly from elements who took part in
the 2006 rebellion.1
Since the mid to late 1990s, militant Islamist and non-Tuareg
armed groups such as the GSPC (which later became AQIM) and
transnational criminal groups took a hold in the region, thanks to
the dysfunctional situation above mentioned. These groups
exploited state weakness to use commercial routes and enmesh
themselves in the population (Boas & Torheim, 2013). After the
Libya crisis, these groups obtained weaponry, former foreign
Libyan Legion soldiers came back to northern Mali, and important
remittances networks collapsed, all contributing to destabilize the
region.
In January 2012, the MNLA attacked a military garrison as part
of their call for an independent, secular and plural Azawad. The
MNLA joined AQIM, Ansar Dine and the MUJAO (a splinter group
from AQIM), and between January and April 2012 they took control
of main towns in the three northern administrative regions. The
Islamist groups quickly chased the MNLA away from these towns
(Boas & Torheim, 2013). Following the Malian army defeat at
Aguelhok, unease grew in the south as the government seemed
unable to cope with the crisis. This eventually led to the mutiny
and then the putsch in March 2012 of junior soldiers under the
leadership of Captain Sanogo. Unwittingly, the putsch further
weakened the state and the advances of Islamist groups was even-
tually stopped after the ‘‘Serval” military operation. Since then, the
groups have retreated from the main towns but are still active, and
the international operation is still on the ground (under the new
moniker of ‘‘Barkhane”).
2.2. Conflict in Mopti region
According the ACLED database, the last 20-year period saw a
total of 1304 conflict related events and 3071 fatalities in Mali.
Over 80% of the total conflict related events and fatalities are con-
centrated in the five-year period between 2012 and 2016. Fig. 1
highlights the distribution of conflict events per region, confirming
the concentration of conflict in the Northern regions of the country.
Although the study region of Mopti is not part of the north of
Mali, it experienced substantial conflict. During the last 20 years
6% of total conflict events and 11% of total fatalities in Mali took
place in the Mopti region, and these percentages doubled during
the 2012–2016 period. In Mopti, over 95% of conflict events and
fatalities over the last 20 years took place between 2012 and
2016. As in the other regions in Northern Mali, conflict peaked in
Mopti during 2013. However, unlike Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu
regions that experienced general declines in conflict events and
fatalities from 2013 onwards, conflict related events and fatalities
in Mopti increased by 7% and 22% respectively between 2015 and
2016. Between 2012 and 2016, battles between Government
and armed groups were the primary cause of conflict related
fatalities, and were responsible for 58% of total fatalities. Violence1 Unlike previous Tuareg rebel groups, the MNLA was clearly a separatist group
(and not an autonomist one).
Please cite this article in press as: Tranchant, J.-P., et al. The impact of food assis
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period.2.3. Humanitarian aid in Mali
Amidst these crises, the complex emergency combining drought
throughout the country and the conflict in the north, was the focus
of two projects by the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP) in Mali,
including: (i) emergency operation (EMOP) 200389 ‘‘Assistance to
drought-affected populations in Mali”; and (ii) regional EMOP
200438 ‘‘Assistance to Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons
Affected by Insecurity in Mali”. These two projects reached approx-
imately 100,000 internally displaced and 200,000 vulnerable peo-
ple in the targeted regions of the country. The EMOP was
implemented alongside a country program (CP) and a protracted
relief and recovery operation (PRRO) that delivered humanitarian
aid to different areas of the country. The WFP activities including
the EMOP were aligned with WFP’s Strategic Objective 1, which
is ‘‘to save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies”, and
sought to contribute towards the Millennium Development Goals
1, 2, 4 and 5, respectively on eradicating extreme poverty and hun-
ger, supporting universal education, reducing child mortality and
improving maternal health. The EMOP started in late January
2013 and ended in 2014. A subsequent project was implemented
to continue to provide assistance during 2015. The project activi-
ties were carefully planned to ensure complementarity with the
WFP country program, which targets similar interventions to
chronically food-insecure populations in the south of Mali, through
food/cash for assets, nutrition and school feeding. The EMOP
supported approximately 564,000 vulnerable and food-insecure
people across the most affected areas of the country.
The specific objectives of the EMOP were to:
 Improve the food consumption of targeted food-insecure
displaced and other conflict affected communities;
 Prevent acute malnutrition among children 6–59 months and
pregnant and lactating women; and
 Treat moderate acute malnutrition among children 6–59
months and malnourished pregnant and lactating women.
The relevant WFP food assistance activities included in the
response are summarized in Table 1. These included supplemen-
tary feeding to prevent and treat acute malnutrition, general food
distribution and school feeding. The Government of Mali adopted
a national school feeding policy in 2009 and in 2012, prior to the
political crisis, there were about 2,000 schools with a canteen in
the country, accounting for 37% of schools in food-insecure areas.
Following the crisis, the school feeding program continued to oper-
ate in schools that were already covered, although in the northern
part of the country, it transformed into an emergency relief pro-
gram. Humanitarian aid was targeted to schools with canteens
(WFP, 2014). In Mopti, which is not one of the northern regions,
the school feeding program mostly continued as planned.3. Data and methods
3.1. Data sources
This longitudinal study is based on two rounds of surveys in the
Mopti region of Mali. The baseline survey was undertaken as part
of cluster-randomized trial of home-grown school feeding that
had to be abandoned due to the conflict onset (Masset & Gelli,
2013). Data was collected from 66 communities (villages) ran-
domly selected among food-insecure districts in the region.
Twenty-five households with children in the original target 5–15tance on food insecure populations during conflict: Evidence from a quasi-
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Fig. 1. Total conflict events in Mali between 1997 and 2016 by region. Source: ACLED.
Table 1
WFP’s food assistance activities in northern Mali from January 2013 onwards.
Intervention Targets Objectives Activities
Blanket supplementary feeding
to prevent AM
Children 6–59 months and pregnant and
lactating women
Implement blanket
supplementary feeding to help
prevent an increase in AM
Provide children half a sachet of
Plumpy’ Sup per day. Providing
Super Cereal and vegetable oil to
pregnant and lactating women.
Nutrition and hygiene messages
for mothers.
Targeted supplementary feeding
aimed at treating AM
Children 6–59 months with MAM and
malnourished pregnant and lactating
women
Treat moderate acute
malnutrition among children 6–
59 months and malnourished
PLW
Targeted supplementary feeding,
providing 92 g of Plumpy’Sup
per day
Targeted food assistance (GFD) Food-insecure populations, IDPs. Women
headed HHs, HHs who have lost income/
assets, and HHs with elderly or disabled
people
Assist all accessible moderately
and severely food-insecure
households and non-displaced
people, displaced people, and
host communities
Provide 2,100 kcal per person
per day, consisting of cereals,
pulses, vegetable oil and salt,
with Super Cereal to increase
micronutrient intake
School feeding Primary school children in areas with high
food insecurity
Prevent hunger and provide
incentives to arrive on time and
attend school until lunchtime;
school attendance will also
reduce the exposure of children
to other risks.
Two daily meals will be
provided: a morning porridge of
Super Cereal and a midday meal
consisting of cereal, pulses,
vegetable oil and salt
Note: AM refers to Acute Malnutrition. Source: WFP documentation and stakeholders interviews.
4 J.-P. Tranchant et al. /World Development xxx (2018) xxx–xxxyear age group were randomly selected for interviews within each
community. The sampling of households was conducted through
interviews with village chiefs and other community level stake-
holders, building a list of enlarged households in the villages
within the school catchment area. The listing also included anPlease cite this article in press as: Tranchant, J.-P., et al. The impact of food assis
experiment in Mali. World Development (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worldapproximation of the size of the enlarged households. In addition,
a number of farmer households was oversampled in each village.
The community groups were asked to list which farmers they
would contact if they were to purchase food within the village
for the provision of school meals. This latter information was usedtance on food insecure populations during conflict: Evidence from a quasi-
dev.2018.01.027
2 We measured consumption of vitamin A, iron and zinc, as deficiencies in each of
these micro-nutrient are widespread and linked with well-known health and
nutrition issues. We do not have recent information regarding zinc availability, but
existing evidence suggests widespread prevalence of micro-nutrient deficiencies in
Mali. 59% of pre-school children are estimated to suffer from vitamin A deficiency and
83% of them are anemic (caused by iron deficiency). The corresponding figures for
pregnant women are 17% and 73%, respectively (WHO, 2008, 2009).
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were randomly selected (with inclusion probability proportional to
size) from the list provided by the village chiefs, and listings of the
restricted households within each selected enlarged households
were then developed through interviews with household heads.
A restricted household with children aged 5 to 15 was then ran-
domly selected within each selected enlarged non-farmer house-
hold. A similar selection procedure was used for farmer
households when these exceeded the numbers of 10 and 5 in the
project and control villages, respectively. In farmer households
though, no age criteria were used and the household was identified
around the main agricultural holding unit of the enlarged house-
hold. At baseline, questionnaires collected data at household level
and for each relevant household member separately. All children
aged 2–15 within each restricted households in the survey sample
were selected for anthropometry measures. In addition, all chil-
dren aged 5–15 also underwent tests of literacy, numeracy and
cognition. A follow-up survey was undertaken in January 2017
including all the 66 villages in the Mopti region in the baseline
sample. New survey modules were added to explore conflict expo-
sure, receipt of humanitarian aid, as well as a range of other poten-
tial health outcomes not covered at baseline.
3.2. Conceptual framework
To understand the program theory for the intervention we build
on the 2013 Lancet Series framework on Maternal and Child Nutri-
tion (Black et al., 2013). This framework describes how optimal
nutrition depends on health, dietary, and behavioral determinants,
and is influenced by the underlying food security, care-giving
resources and environmental conditions.
The Lancet Series framework can also be used to identify path-
ways through which conflict events could affect populations both
directly and indirectly. For example, effects on nutrition status
could arise by changes in food access and availability (e.g. break-
down of food markets, loss of harvest or stocks due to conflict);
or care-giving practices (e.g. death of caregivers, or decrease in
women’s mental health due to increased insecurity); or health sta-
tus (e.g. no access to health facilities and medicines, or contamina-
tion or loss of water sources due to conflict). In addition,
differential effects would be expected on displaced versus host
families, in terms of exposure to new infectious diseases (e.g.
malaria in the south of Mali), or on changes in food intake (e.g. dif-
ferent food customs) and care (e.g. no space in health centers and
schools). In addition, closure of health centers and schools would
not only affect health and education outcomes directly, but as
these facilities are often used as distribution points for humanitar-
ian aid these events could also have other negative spillovers on
the community. Conflict may also have long-lasting consequences
that affect long-term outcomes. For example, children can be
affected at critical growth stages and become stunted or their cog-
nitive ability can be severely impaired. Similarly, farmer house-
holds may suffer economic shocks from which they cannot
recover and become destitute so that an impact on poverty can
be visible even years after conflict has ended. In addition, emerging
evidence suggests that conflict can severely undermine the most
elaborate coping strategies used by households to face risk, and
the ability to rely on informal networks for aid becomes critical.
Conflict may also weaken the effectiveness of these networks (if
people or cash cannot move anymore because of violence, for
example). In addition, while being an ally or friend of people with
access to key resources is always good in times of peace, this can be
dangerous during conflict if the same powerful people are targeted
for violence. In these contexts, whether humanitarian aid is a com-
plement or a substitute to basic, informal solidarity remains an
important question for research.Please cite this article in press as: Tranchant, J.-P., et al. The impact of food assis
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We considered two levels of outcomes in the survey population
based on the analysis of the program theory of the intervention.
The first level included measures of household food security calcu-
lated from the consumption and expenditure modules of the
household survey. The second level focuses on a proxy measure
for the nutrition status of children. We calculated the value (in
West African Francs, FCFA) of household food and non-food con-
sumption, and household energy and nutrient availability2 from
data on the consumption of 52 foods over a seven-day recall period.
Quantities were converted from local units to kilograms. Missing
units were imputed from commodity-specific unit modes at differ-
ent aggregation levels: household, village, community, commune,
cercle, and region. Net quantities were obtained by multiplying
reported quantities by food-specific edible fractions. Energy and
nutrient consumption were calculated using a Mali food composition
table (Barikmo, Ouattara, & Oshaug, 2004). All outcomes were calcu-
lated per capita and per adult equivalent (AE) to account for house-
hold size and composition differences. AE factors were assigned by
dividing household members’ age and sex specific recommended
daily energy intake by a reference average recommended intake of
2636 kcal. The reference was calculated by taking the average energy
needs of men and women aged 18 to 59.9 years. We used a weight of
56.2 kg for women aged 18–29.9, 58.6 kg for women aged 30–59.9,
66.2 kg for men aged 18.29.9, and 68.6 kg for men aged 30–59.9. A
moderate physical activity level was assumed. Individual AE units
were summed to yield the number of household AE units. We
assessed energy and nutrient consumption from 12 food groups:
cereals and grains, roots and tubers, legumes, nuts and pulses, fruits,
vegetables, meat and poultry, fish and seafood, milk and dairy prod-
ucts, eggs, oils and fats, sweets, and spices, condiments and bever-
ages (Swindale & Bilinsky, 2006). The value of food consumption
was also calculated for these 12 groups. In addition, we examined
the value of non-food expenditure from 8 non-food groups: energy,
tobacco and cigarettes, transportation, hygiene, clothing, durable
goods, housing, and social events. Anthropometry data included
measurements of height and weight for all children from 24 months
to 15 years of age. Height or length was measured to the nearest 0.1
cm using portable fixed base stadiometers and weight was measured
to the nearest 0.1 kg using electronic scales. HAZ and WHZ scores
were calculated using the 2006 WHO growth standard for children
under 5 years (WHO, 2006). Stunting was defined as HAZ < 2 SD
and wasting as WHZ < 2 SD. However, due to issues related to
the measurement of dates of birth that are critical for the calculation
of anthropometric indices we limited the analysis to measuring
changes in height during the 5 year study period in a cohort of chil-
dren aged 2–5 at baseline. Data was collected by trained enumera-
tors using electronic tablets with computer-assisted personal
interview (CAPI) software.
Tables 2 and 3 present summary statistics for these outcomes at
baseline and endline, respectively. Table 2 also display information
on key pre-intervention variables that we will use for the matching
process that we describe in the next subsection. All the study out-
come variables collected at baseline and endline have been
trimmed to exclude extreme values.tance on food insecure populations during conflict: Evidence from a quasi-
dev.2018.01.027
Table 2
Summary statistics at baseline, January 2012.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Secondary school within 5 km 0.327 0.469 0 1 1717
Market within 5 km 0.24 0.427 0 1 1717
Past project 0.575 0.494 0 1 1717
Village considered unsafe 0.063 0.243 0 1 1592
Age head of household 48.85 13.591 20 101 1709
Expenditures per capita (FCFA) 161154.425 123832.612 16882.082 1598408 1717
Household size 7.037 2.988 1 19 1717
Depend ratio 1.575 0.858 0.1 6.5 1655
Food groups consumed 6.736 1.309 2 10 1715
Polygamous household 0.284 0.451 0 1 1709
Worker 0.045 0.207 0 1 1709
Land size 3.521 3.869 0 80 1717
Share of food in budget 0.746 0.136 0.044 0.987 1715
Assets value 11.441 1.487 7.313 15.299 1702
Monthly expenditures per AE (FCFA)⁄ 16383.19 12101.37 3360.81 85559.7 1662
Monthly food expenditures per AE (FCFA)⁄ 11137.02 9146.2 1795.937 63009.03 1659
Share of food in budget⁄ 0.690 0.157 0.328 0.952 1574
Calories consumed daily per AE⁄ 3342.089 2216.13 559.07 13606.47 1634
Protein consumed daily per AE⁄ 97.5 61.73 16.98 377.47 1644
Iron consumed daily per AE⁄ 23.204 14.753 3.756 86.005 1643
Zinc consumed daily per AE⁄ 33.892 23.097 3.410 143.246 1636
Vitamin A consumed daily per AE⁄ 496.70 697.176 0.000 3967.48 1693
Dietary Diversity Score 6.703 1.743 1 11 1715
Height (cm) of children under 5 in 2012 95.061 15.283 8.1 190.7 1379
Note: The ⁄ indicates that the variable has been trimmed to exclude values below the 2.5th percentile and above the 97.5th percentile of the distribution. AE refers to Adult
Equivalent. 1 FCFA translates into 0.002 USD.
Table 3
Summary statistics at endline, January 2017.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Monthly expenditures per AE (FCFA)⁄ 17498.43 13234.5 3358.762 86342.45 1319
Monthly food expenditures per AE (FCFA)⁄ 11873.43 9763.785 1805.667 63908.97 1322
Share of food in budget⁄ 0.703 0.159 0.328 0.951 1250
Calories (kcal) consumed daily per AE⁄ 3260.855 2233.855 538.474 13705.97 1347
Protein (gram) consumed daily per AE⁄ 87.323 61.425 16.511 378.413 1337
Iron (mg) consumed daily per AE⁄ 20.433 14.183 3.814 86.717 1338
Zinc (mg) consumed daily per AE⁄ 32.059 22.708 3.520 142.147 1345
Vitamin A (mcg) consumed daily per AE⁄ 862.198 848.417 0.000 3949.502 1366
Dietary Diversity Score 6.093 2.121 0 11 1422
Height (cm) of children under 5 in 2012 123.208 13.1 12 189 1000
Any aid 0.326 0.469 0 1 1422
GFD 0.218 0.413 0 1 1408
TSF 0.023 0.151 0 1 1408
SF 0.143 0.351 0 1 1408
Number of types of aid 0.409 0.624 0 2 1422
Note: The ⁄ indicates that the variable has been trimmed to exclude values below the 2.5th percentile and above the 97.5th percentile of the distribution. AE refers to Adult
Equivalent. 1 FCFA translates into 0.002 USD.
GFD: General Food Distribution; TSF: Targeted Supplementary Feeding; SF: School Feeding.
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We employ a matched difference-in-difference approach to
estimate the impact of food assistance in conflict-affected areas.
Using the classical notation of Dawid (1979), the change in out-
come of interest Y between time t and t
0
for household h receiving
food assistance A is DY1h ¼ Y1ht0  Y1ht whereas the corresponding
change for a household that did not receive food assistance A is
DY0h ¼ Y0ht0  Y0ht . Obviously, household h either receives aid or does
not receive aid, so that only one outcome is observed:
DYh ¼ DY1h:PðA ¼ 1Þ þ DY0h:PðA ¼ 0Þ, where P indicates the proba-
bility of receiving aid. The effect of treatment at the household
level remains therefore unknown but we can estimate the average
effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT).
ATT ¼ E½Y1ht0  Y0ht jA ¼ 1  E½Y0ht0  Y0htjA ¼ 0 ð1Þ
The matched difference-in-difference estimations will allow us to
retrieve the ATT if the following identifying assumption is valid:Please cite this article in press as: Tranchant, J.-P., et al. The impact of food assis
experiment in Mali. World Development (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worldE½Y0ht0  Y0ht jA ¼ 1 ¼ E½Y0ht0  Y0htjA ¼ 0 ð2ÞEq. (2) requires that in the counterfactual situation in which aid
recipients would have not received aid, there would be no differ-
ence in the evolution of Y between ‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ house-
holds. This assumption of parallel trend is weaker than the
corresponding assumption for the matching estimator, which is that
‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ households would be characterized by a
similar level of the outcome of interest at time t
0
. Such an assump-
tion would likely not hold. On the one hand, the mission statement
of WFP and the EMOP project documents highlight the need to deli-
ver assistance to the most vulnerable. On the other hand, the con-
flict, remoteness and various financial and logistical challenges
may have caused food aid to fail to reach the most vulnerable.
Focusing on changes over time, which is enabled by the panel data
at out disposal, contributes to alleviate this source of selection bias.
To further account for potential selection bias, we also resort to
propensity score matching, exploiting our unique pre-crisis
baseline. Specifically, we estimate the likelihood to receive aidtance on food insecure populations during conflict: Evidence from a quasi-
dev.2018.01.027
Fig. 2. Distribution of estimated propensity scores. Source: Authors’ calculations.
3 We have used the user-written package diff in Stata 14 to perform the analysis.
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ing the logic of the matching estimator, the covariates included in
X are measured before the intervention and are related to both
the selection into treatment and the outcome of interest. In so
doing, we are ensuring that treatment and control households are
as similar as possible across the full range of confounding factors.
We include in the estimation of the propensity score a range of
household and village characteristics measured at baseline. These
are, at the village-level, the presence of a secondary school within
5 km, the presence of a market within 5 km, and conflict exposure
(see below for definition of the latter variable). At the household-
level, the variables we control for are whether children were
involved in past projects, feelings of safety, age of the household
head, expenditures per capita, household expenditures quintiles,
the logarithm of value of assets, household size, dependency ratio,
number of food groups consumed, whether the household is polyg-
amous, whether the head of household identified as a worker, the
amount of cultivated land, and the share of food expenditures in
the household budget. The propensity score was estimated with
a Logit estimator and the distributions of the estimated propensity
in treatment and control groups score displayed a high degree of
overlap across all variables of aid (see Fig. 2).
We use the propensity score to weight the treatment and con-
trol samples to conduct a kernel propensity score difference-in-
difference (Heckman, Hichimura, & Todd, 1998; Hirano, Imbens,
& Ridder, 2003) in the region of common support. The weight,
wh, is calculated as such: wh ¼ 1=p^h for treatment subjects and
wh ¼ 1=ð1 p^hÞ for control subjects, where p^h is the estimatedPlease cite this article in press as: Tranchant, J.-P., et al. The impact of food assis
experiment in Mali. World Development (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worldpropensity score for household h. Applying these weights adjusts
for the systematic imbalances in covariates between treatment
and control subjects so that the kernel propensity score
difference-in-difference estimator provides unbiased estimate of
the ATT under the unconfoundness assumption.3
The key question of the paper is to evaluate the effect of aid in
conflict-affected contexts. We use a twofold strategy to handle the
interactions between conflict and aid. In a first set of estimations,
we control for the exposure to conflict in the period immediately
following the coup (2012–2014). In other words, we estimate the
probability for households to receive aid over the period 2014–
2016 based on baseline characteristics and exposure to conflict in
the period 2012–2014. This provides a benchmark estimate of the
average effect of food assistance for treated households in the
Mopti area.
In a second set of estimations, we assess whether the impact of
food assistance is heterogeneous with respect to exposure to con-
flict. The goal of these estimations is to ascertain whether food
assistance is effective in situations of acute fragility. To do that,
we estimate the propensity score separately for the subgroup of
conflict-affected areas and the subgroup of non-affected areas.
3.5. Operationalization of food assistance
We previously described how the WFP operations in northern
Mali combined (i) supplementary feeding for children below fivetance on food insecure populations during conflict: Evidence from a quasi-
dev.2018.01.027
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treat malnutrition (targeted), (ii) targeted general food assistance
for vulnerable households, and (iii) school feeding in areas of food
insecurity. The endline survey included questions on different
forms of food assistance that WFP or other development partners
may have provided to the study populations. Alongside general
food distribution (GFD), targeted supplementary feeding (TSF),
and school feeding (SF) we added the modality of food for work
(FFW) that was also provided by WFP and partners as part of the
Country Program running in parallel to the EMOP.
In our survey conducted in January 2017, we asked village and
household respondents about their experience with food assis-
tance. We begin by describing the operationalization of food assis-
tance based on the availability of aid at village-level.
General food distribution (GFD) was the most common form of
food assistance in the study population, with 51 out of 63 village
respondents declaring that GFD occurred in their village since
2012. School feeding and TSF were reported to have been imple-
mented in 26 and 24 villages, respectively.4 It is interesting to note
that targeted supplementary feeding and school feeding programs
were mostly implemented in villages where general food distribu-
tion was also present. Hence, only three villages experienced TSF
or SF without any GFD program.
In the household survey, detailed questions on aid were asked
for the period covering the 24 month prior to the endline data col-
lection to avoid measurement errors and recall bias. According to
the household-level data, 66.6% of households did not receive
any food assistance, 22.5% of households received GFD, 14.3%
received school feeding, 2.4% received targeted school feeding
and 1.9% participated in food for work programs. There is a limited
overlap between these modalities of aid at household level as only
7.4% of households received two forms of aid or more. Once again,
when overlap exists, it overwhelmingly involved GFD which has
been reported by 94% of households who received at least two
forms of aid.
In summary, we characterize aid provision and intensity of
exposure to aid in the last 24 months (2014–16) through the fol-
lowing variables: a binary variable Any aid which takes the value
1 if the household received any form of aid, a binary variable
GFD which takes the value 1 if the household received GFD, a bin-
ary variable SF which takes the value 1 if the household received
school feeding and a categorical variable Number of types of aid
which takes the value 0 if the household receives no aid, the value
1 if the household receives 1 form of aid, and the value 2 if the
household received 2 forms of aid or more.53.6. Operationalization of conflict
The endline household and community surveys collected infor-
mation on presence of armed groups and a wide range of violent
events, some of which were directly linked with the armed conflict.
We capture exposure to the armed conflict through questions
on the presence of armed groups that were asked in the village
questionnaire. Indeed, it is important to note that the notions of
violent conflict and control need to be distinguished. As Kalyvas
(2006) argues, violent conflict is most likely to occur in contested4 In addition, two villages respondents declared the presence of food-for-work
program. In each of these villages, GFD was also reported.
5 Aid has been scaled-down after 2015, which is why we do not use current aid
receipt as our variable of interest. We do not know whether people who received aid
on the period 2014–2016 also received aid in the previous period. However, our
understanding of the emergency operations in Mali is that aid operations after 2014
were a continuation of the previous emergency aid operations. It is then likely that
people exposed to aid on the period 2014–16 were already beneficiaries in the period
2013–14 whereas people not receiving aid in the latter period did not benefit from
previous aid.
Please cite this article in press as: Tranchant, J.-P., et al. The impact of food assis
experiment in Mali. World Development (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worldareas between state and rebel forces and least likely to occur in
areas firmly under the control of either factions. As a result, the
absence of violent events in the household survey does not neces-
sarily mean that respondents were sheltered from the effects of the
armed conflict. In fact, households living in rebel-held territories
may suffer from the range of indirect impacts of the conflict even
in the absence of exposure to direct violence. Indirect conse-
quences include the withdrawal of the state apparatus (not always
replaced by rebel governance), absence of NGOs and aid system,
fear and inability to travel to the market or towns. Tranchant
et al. (2014) show that these indirect effects exert a very strong
adverse effect of households’ ability to cope with income shocks
for households living in the shadow of the Naxal insurgency in
India.
According to the village survey, 11 villages were still experienc-
ing the presence of armed groups during the survey period, 55 vil-
lages did not report such a presence, and for 2 villages the
information was not known. Out of the 11 villages experiencing
the presence of armed groups, five villages reported the presence
of unnamed ‘‘armed bandits”, three reported the presence of the
MUJAO, three reported the presence of Ansar Eddine, one reported
the presence of the MNLA, and one reported the presence of AQMI.
As is implicit from the above, two villages report multiple armed
groups (one village reported four armed groups, and another one
two).
There is a high degree of persistence in the presence of armed
groups. Out of the 11 villages where armed groups were still pre-
sent, nine villages reported the groups were already in the locality
between January 2012 and the time of survey. Conversely, two vil-
lages were experiencing the presence of armed groups during the
survey period though the armed groups were not present in the
period following the coup. Out of the 55 villages without the pres-
ence of armed groups, only three had experienced their presence at
some point since January 2012. A detailed look at the timing of first
arrival of armed groups in the 13 villages which ever reported their
presence shows that five of these villages were affected in 2012
(three in April, one in June, one in September) and five others were
affected in 2013. The two remaining villages were affected much
later, in August 2016 and February 2017, respectively.
The village questionnaire included questions on the behaviors
of armed groups. These groups were depicted as violent (12 out
13 villages report the groups attack civilians) and a threat to indi-
viduals’ livelihoods (in 11 of the 13 villages). However, the groups
seemed unwilling or unable to insert themselves in the population
and/or to impose order (none of the villages report that the groups
relied on the population for food, enforced tax or payments,
attempted to solve local conflicts, or offered services to the popu-
lation). The only exception concerned the imposition of the Sharia
law, which six villages reported that the groups aimed to enforce
(whole or parts of it) at the local level.
Whereas 16% of the villages (11) reported experiencing the
presence of armed groups in the locale itself, 77% of them (52)
reported that armed groups were present in the region (six did
not provide information). In 34 villages, armed groups arrived in
2012 and in 12 villages they arrived in 2013. Five villages reported
the presence of armed groups before the conflict started, as early as
2009. Finally, and consistent with the notion that insecurity is
appearing to spread in the Mopti region, 17 villages respondents
declared that their regions were first affected only in 2016 or 2017.
The presence of armed groups will be operationalized through:
(i) a binary variable Armed groups in villagewhich takes the value 1
if the village has ever experienced the presence of an armed group
since the beginning of the conflict, and (ii) a binary variable Armed
groups in region which takes the value 1 if the region in which the
village is located has ever experienced the presence of an armed
group since the beginning of the conflict.tance on food insecure populations during conflict: Evidence from a quasi-
dev.2018.01.027
Table 4
Presence of armed groups and conflict-related violence.
% of households reporting the presence
of:
No armed groups in
region
Armed groups in region but not in
village
Armed groups in
village
Pearson Chi-squared
Statistic
Banditry 13.3 13.0 38.9 76.45***
Terrorist attacks 6.2 4.6 22.2 69.12***
Political violence 1.0 3.5 6.8 9.5***
Destruction of infrastructures 0.0 0.8 1.5 2.71
Kidnappings 0.0 1.6 4.4 11.1***
Lynchings 0.0 0.9 1.5 2.55
Any conflict-related violence 15.9 15.7 46.4 95.3***
Stars represent the p-value associated with the Pearson Chi squared test.
***: p < .01; **: p < .05; *: p < .1.
Table 5
Presence of armed groups and mobility.
Respondent declared fear when traveling to: No armed groups in
region
Armed groups in region but not in
village
Armed groups in
village
Pearson
Chi2
the market to buy food 42.6 42.0 66.7 41.16***
the market to sell food 40.5 41.3 66.2 42.9***
look for work 35.4 38.1 67.6 63.3***
the health center 29.2 21.2 52.7 79.1***
the aid center 25.6 19.8 44.0 50.0***
to buy/sell agricultural inputs 24.1 25.8 46.4 36.2***
anywhere outside village 47.2 49.3 78.3 59.4***
Respondents reduced trips of their children to
school
11.8 16.7 34.3 40.4***
Stars represent the p-value associated with the Pearson Chi squared test.
***: p < .01; **: p < .05; *: p < .1.
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The presence of armed groups was not innocuous. First, there is
an overlap between presence of armed groups and conflict-related
violence in our sample. As shown by Table 4, whereas 16% of
households experienced conflict-related violence in villages free
from the presence of armed groups (whether they are present in
the region or not), 47.3% experienced conflict-related violence in
villages where armed groups have been present. There was a
strong discontinuity between villages where armed groups have
been present and other villages on all types of conflict-related vio-
lence. However, there was a not a clear demarcation between vil-
lages located in areas where armed groups have been present
and villages located in areas free from armed groups. Political vio-
lence, kidnappings and lynchings were more prevalent in the for-
mer, but the differences were not substantive, and there was no
difference in terms of banditry or terrorist attacks.
Second, the presence of armed conflict negatively affected
households through fear and reduced mobility. Table 5 shows the
cross-tabulation between households’ self-reported levels of fear
of traveling and presence of armed groups. A similar pattern
emerged to that shown in Table 4. Table 5 shows that households
living in villages where armed groups have been present were
much more likely to have reduced their travels than households
living in villages where armed groups had been absent (irrespec-
tive of whether or not the presence of these armed groups are
reported in the wider region). The table also highlights a wide-
spread fear of traveling in conflict-affected villages, that affected
over 78% of households. This translated into fewer trips to the mar-
ket, health center, job fairs etc. as well as in reduced trips to school
for children.
Finally, Table 6 explores the relationships between presence of
armed groups, feelings of safety and social capital in villages. With
regards to feelings of safety, the table shows that the presence of
armed groups at the regional level was important. Whereas 63%
of respondents in regions where no armed groups were present feltPlease cite this article in press as: Tranchant, J.-P., et al. The impact of food assis
experiment in Mali. World Development (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worldsafe, only 47% of respondents in regions with armed groups felt
similarly safe. Over the last 4 years, there was a monotonic rela-
tionship between proximity to armed groups and feelings of safety.
52% of households in regions without armed groups felt safe, 37%
of households in regions with armed groups but in villages directly
unaffected by armed groups felt safe, and only 20% of households
in villages directly affected by armed groups felt safe. The relation-
ship between responses related to social capital and proximity to
armed groups was less strong, with the main difference arising
between villages with direct presence of armed groups and others.
3.8. Food assistance and conflict
Does food assistance reach populations in conflict-affected
areas? Table 7 shows that the relationships between availability
of food assistance programs and presence of conflict were complex.
Access to any food assistance program at village level decreased as
proximity with armed groups increased. Whereas food assistance
was potentially available for all households living in villages unaf-
fected by armed groups, the proportion went down to 90% in vil-
lages indirectly affected (i.e. groups were present in the region
but not in the village) and to 76% in villages directly affected by
presence of armed groups. Availability of least two forms of food
assistance program was, however, roughly similar at the extreme
of the conflict spectrum (40%) and was highest in villages indirectly
affected (59%).
Looking at the modalities of aid, increased proximity with
armed groups reduced access to GFD. The likelihood to have access
to GFD + TSF, however, was highest in villages indirectly affected
(43%), lowest in villages directly affected (11.6%), and in between
in unaffected villages (31%). Finally, the likelihood to have access
to GFD and school feeding was twice as high in directly and indi-
rectly affected villages (about 40%) than in unaffected villages
(20%). This suggests that the school feeding program in Mopti
has been used as an emergency platform for scaling-up aid provi-
sion in conflict-affected areas.tance on food insecure populations during conflict: Evidence from a quasi-
dev.2018.01.027
Table 6
Presence of armed groups, safety and social capital.
No armed groups in region Armed groups in region but not in village Armed groups in village Pearson Chi2
Feel safe in community 63.1 47.6 46.9 15.8***
Felt safe in community
over last 4 years 52.3 37.4 19.8 46.0***
Feel that people in community
commonly discuss problems 93.8 92.2 88.2 4.6*
Feel that people in community
commonly help each other out 91.7 85.9 78.6 14.0***
Stars represent the p-value associated with the Pearson Chi squared test.
***: p < .01; **: p < .05; *: p < .1.
Table 7
Availability of food assistance programs and presence of armed groups.
No armed groups in region Armed groups in region but not in village Armed groups in village Pearson Chi2
% Households living in villages with:
Any type of food assistance 100.0 90.4 76.3 61.7***
No food assistance program 0.0 9.6 23.7 61.8***
1 food assistance program 60.0 31.4 35.3 54.3***
2 + food assistance programs 40.0 59.0 41.1 35.5***
GFD 91.3 83.9 76.3 16.6***
GFD + TSF 31.3 42.5 11.6 69.4***
GFD + SF 19.5 43.4 41.1 37.8***
% Households receiving:
Any type of food assistance 40.0 28.1 32.9 10.7***
No food assistance 59.5 71.4 66.7 10.5***
1 food assistance program 30.3 22.0 29.0 8.2**
2 + food assistance programs 10.3 6.6 4.4 5.7*
GFD 31.4 17.1 26.2 22.7***
SF 15.5 13.4 8.7 4.5
Access to aid means that the corresponding aid program is present in the village.
Stars represent the p-value associated with the Pearson Chi squared test. ***: p < .01; **: p < .05; *: p < .1.
GFD: General Food Distribution; TSF: Targeted Supplementary Feeding; SF: School Feeding.
6 It is worth noting that these are nominal consumption figures.
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the household perspective. The likelihood for households to receive
any aid decreased when armed groups were present in the region
(from 40% in unaffected villages to 33% in affected villages). Simi-
larly, households were highly less likely to receive two forms of aid
or more as proximity with armed groups increased (4.4% versus
10%). There was, however, a much weaker relationship between
the presence of armed groups and likelihood to receive one form
of aid (and the likelihood was smallest in indirectly affected vil-
lages). Examining the modalities of aid revealed that households
were most likely to receive GFD in unaffected villages (31%), fol-
lowed by households in directly affected villages (26%) and house-
holds in indirectly affected villages (17%). Finally, the likelihood of
receiving school feeding was twice as low in villages where armed
groups were present than elsewhere (despite the above finding on
availability of school feeding from the village-level data).
To summarize, in our study population, access to aid tended to
decrease as proximity with armed groups increased, contrary to
what a logic of prioritization of conflict-affected populations would
imply, though perhaps reflecting the practicalities of operations
during conflict. This manifested itself in a higher likelihood for
conflict-affected households to live in villages without any access
to aid, and a lower likelihood for conflict affected populations to
live in villages with one form of food assistance. However, villages
where armed groups were present were as likely to have access to
two forms of aid than villages in peaceful environments. The rela-
tionship between proximity to armed groups and access to aid is
not as marked at the household-level. The strongest effect of con-
flict was to reduce the chance to receive two forms of aid and a
lower likelihood to obtain school feeding, in contradiction with
village level information.Please cite this article in press as: Tranchant, J.-P., et al. The impact of food assis
experiment in Mali. World Development (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.world3.9. Change in study outcomes
Table 8 shows the mean change in study outcomes between
2012 and 2017 in the overall sample, and in the three subgroups
defined by proximity of the respondents with the armed groups.
The crisis situation in Mopti is manifest in that households only
increased average expenditures per adult equivalent by less than
FCFA 1220 over the whole period, corresponding to an increase
of just 0.7% of the initial consumption level6. Furthermore, calories
and micro-nutrient intake decreased between 2012 and 2017. The
drop is particularly salient for protein and iron, for which the mean
consumption is 10% lower in 2017 than it was in 2012. The corre-
sponding decrease in calories and zinc intake per adult equivalent
was more modest (less than 1% of the baseline values). In sharp con-
trast to this picture of deteriorating food security, consumption of
vitamin A increased by 308 microgram over the study period, corre-
sponding to a 73% increase of the baseline value.
Surprisingly, households located nearer to the armed groups
have increased their (food) expenditures substantially more than
households living in region free from their presence, perhaps due
to higher prices. The rise in vitamin A consumption was also stron-
ger when armed groups were present (in the village or in the
region) than where they were not. The intake of calories decreased
the most for households indirectly affected by the armed groups
(-77 calories), and increased the most in villages directly affected
by the conflict (+145 calories). Protein, iron and zinc intake
decreased in a broadly uniform manner with respect to the conflict
situation although zinc consumption only increased in villages
where armed groups were present. This pattern could signal thattance on food insecure populations during conflict: Evidence from a quasi-
dev.2018.01.027
Table 8
Mean change in study outcomes between 2012 and 2017, by exposure to armed groups.
Study outcome Whole Sample No armed groups Armed groups in region Armed groups in village
DMonthly exp. per AE (FCFA)⁄ 1219.34 196.132 1839.191 3041.617
[1213] [417] [584] [128]
DMonthly food exp. per AE (FCFA)⁄ 833.37 21.23 1277.016 1929.277
[1210] [414] [582] [130]
DShare of food in budget⁄ 0.033 0.015 0.039 0.067
[1279] [430] [639] [130]
DCalories consumed daily per AE⁄ 12.65 17.46 71.509 144.645
[1216] [404] [604] [130]
DProtein consumed daily per AE⁄ 9.62 10.12 10.751 8.890
[1213] [405] [599] [132]
DIron consumed daily per AE⁄ 2.46 2.75 2.704 1.799
[1214] [405] [603] [127]
DZinc consumed daily per AE⁄ 1.089 2.57 1.633 2.751
[1216] [402] [613] [125]
DVitamin A consumed daily per AE⁄ 362.85 307.57 356.145 493.56
[1282] [429] [646] [128]
DDietary Diversity Score 0.589 0.45 0.471 1.723
[1420] [475] [717] [141]
DHeight (cm) of children under 5 in 2012 24.270 24.744 24.342 22.587
[2449] [807] [1199] [176]
Note: Sample size in square brackets.
The ⁄ indicates that the variable has been trimmed to exclude values below the 2.5th percentile and above the 97.5th percentile of the distribution. AE refers to Adult
Equivalent.
Table 9
Mean change in study outcomes between 2012 and 2017, by household’s food assistance status
Variable Any Aid Any aid GFD GFD SF SF Number of types of aid
no yes no yes no yes 0 1 2
DExpenditures per AE (FCFA)⁄ 873.656 1879.208 1081.745 1615.23 966.498 2570.608 849.179 2224.369 741.805
[796] [417] [918] [282] [1020] [180] [783] [334] [96]
DFood expenditures per AE (FCFA)⁄ 626.839 1233.386 682.57 1269.865 712.613 1452.636 605.206 1478.814 497.27
[798] [417] [914] [283] [1021] [176] [785] [328] [97]
DShare of food in budget⁄ 0.034 0.029 0.034 0.026 0.031 0.042 0.035 0.029 0.027
[858] [421] [984] [281] [1083] [182] [844] [339] [96]
DCalories consumed daily per AE⁄ 29.22 100.66 40.606 183.806 25.910 92.233 34.183 85.159 180.05
[824] [392] [934] [270] [1039] [165] [812] [312] [92]
DProtein consumed daily per AE⁄ 8.83 11.229 8.338 13.700 9.843 7.795 8.728 10.185 15.426
[815] [398] [927] [273] [1033] [167] [802] [319] [92]
DIron consumed daily per AE⁄ 2.07 3.307 1.979 4.002 2.378 2.841 2.011 2.880 5.142
[818] [396] [928] [273] [1034] [167] [805] [317] [92]
DZinc consumed daily per AE⁄ 0.543 2.225 0.408 3.042 0.969 1.236 0.410 1.841 4.417
[821] [395] [930] [273] [1037] [166] [808] [314] [94]
DVitamin A consumed daily per AE⁄ 318.17 454.549 335.35 461.399 344.455 471.441 317.63 452.758 445.687
[862] [420] [990] [278] [1083] [185] [848] [338] [96]
DDietary Diversity Score 0.551 0.667 0.544 0.694 0.566 0.637 0.533 0.631 0.943
[958] [462] [1099] [307] [1205] [201] [944] [371] [105]
DHeight (cm) of children under 5 in 2012 24.4 24.0 24.5 23.4 24.2 24.6 24.4 24.0 23.9
[1634] [815] [1936] [486] [2021] [401] [1607] [644] [198]
Note: Sample size in parentheses. AE refers to Adult Equivalent.
⁄ indicate that the variable has been trimmed to exclude values below the 2.5th percentile and above the 97.5th percentile of the distribution.
GFD: General Food Distribution; TSF: Targeted Supplementary Feeding; SF: School Feeding.
J.-P. Tranchant et al. /World Development xxx (2018) xxx–xxx 11the presence of armed groups was rather innocuous and/or that
food assistance was more effective in areas directly concerned by
the conflict. Examining child growth, however, reveals that chil-
dren in directly affected villages grew by about 2 cm less than their
counterparts in villages indirectly or unaffected by the presence of
armed groups.
Table 9 displays the evolution of the study outcomes across aid
categories. Households who received any aid (and especially school
feeding) increased their (food) expenditures more than household
without access to aid. However, households who received two
forms of aid have seen a smaller increase in expenditures than
households who received either one form of aid or no aid at all.
The share of food expenditures in the budget did not vary signifi-
cantly with aid categories. Caloric intake, dietary diversity and
micro-nutrient availability decreased the most for households that
received aid (under any form), which may indicate that aidPlease cite this article in press as: Tranchant, J.-P., et al. The impact of food assis
experiment in Mali. World Development (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worldprioritized the most vulnerable. Consumption of vitamin A
increased the most for recipients of aid (in any form). Finally, there
is no obvious relationship between child growth and aid status.
4. Estimating the impact of food assistance in northern Mali
In the first set of estimations, we assume that the whole study
population was affected by the conflict, whether directly or indi-
rectly. Such a view is consistent with insights from Tables 5 and
6. In areas where armed groups were absent, almost half (47%) of
households reported fearing to travel outside their village. Such a
high proportion indicates widespread insecurity and fear, even in
areas that are supposedly out of the reach of armed groups. In
addition, the proportion of households that feared traveling out-
side their village was virtually the same in villages not directly
affected by armed groups, but where armed groups are presenttance on food insecure populations during conflict: Evidence from a quasi-
dev.2018.01.027
Table 10
Determinants of food assistance at household level, Logit estimates.
Number of types of aid
Any aid GFD SF 1 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Secondary school within 5 km 0.056 0.019 0.31 0.070 0.49
(0.17) (0.20) (0.24) (0.18) (0.32)
Market within 5 km 0.85*** 0.95*** 0.64** 0.68*** 1.92***
(0.21) (0.25) (0.30) (0.22) (0.54)
Past project 0.74*** 0.76*** 0.73*** 0.63*** 1.16***
(0.17) (0.20) (0.24) (0.19) (0.32)
Very unsafe 0.62** 0.91** 0.16 0.52 1.10*
(0.29) (0.41) (0.34) (0.32) (0.57)
Age household head 0.0021 0.00045 0.0025 0.0022 0.0062
(0.0061) (0.0069) (0.0084) (0.0066) (0.011)
Expenditures per capita 0.0000021 0.00000069 0.0000033 0.0000017 0.0000030
(0.0000017) (0.0000019) (0.0000022) (0.0000018) (0.0000028)
Household size 0.040 0.014 0.052 0.040 0.059
(0.044) (0.053) (0.058) (0.048) (0.079)
Dependency ratio 0.033 0.0016 0.16 0.016 0.0083
(0.10) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.18)
Food groups consumed 0.0018 0.034 0.057 0.0022 0.046
(0.063) (0.072) (0.088) (0.068) (0.011)
Polygamous household 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.45
(0.19) (0.23) (0.27) (0.21) (0.37)
Worker 0.73* 1.06*** 0.12 0.71* 1.39**
(0.38) (0.39) (0.65) (0.41) (0.58)
Land cultivated 0.0059 0.030 0.024 0.0047 0.015
(0.024) (0.030) (0.030) (0.026) (0.045)
1st quintile expenditures 0.47 0.19 1.14 0.42 0.69
(0.59) (0.67) (0.82) (0.63) (1.06)
2nd quintile expenditures 0.68 0.19 1.00 0.62 0.71
(0.50) (0.57) (0.70) (0.54) (0.91)
3rd quintile expenditures 0.15 0.062 0.19 0.15 0.22
(0.43) (0.49) (0.64) (0.47) (0.80)
4th quintile expenditures 0.33 0.18 0.31 0.27 0.56
(0.38) (0.42) (0.54) (0.41) (0.68)
% of food in budget 0.043 0.90 1.77** 0.013 0.52
(0.55) (0.66) (0.71) (0.60) (0.99)
Logarithm of assets value 0.042 0.075 0.23*** 0.014 0.067
(0.053) (0.060) (0.076) (0.058) (0.095)
Armed groups in village 0.14 0.60** 0.73** 0.28 0.46
(0.21) (0.24) (0.36) (0.23) (0.44)
Armed groups in region 0.41** 0.53** 0.34 0.45** 0.25
(0.21) (0.23) (0.27) (0.23) (0.35)
Observations 981 975 975 981 975
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < :1, ** p < :05, *** p < :01.
GFD: General Food Distribution; TSF: Targeted Supplementary Feeding; SF: School Feeding.
12 J.-P. Tranchant et al. /World Development xxx (2018) xxx–xxxin the wider region. This shows that the demarcation between
areas not affected and areas indirectly affected may not be very
clear (unlike the distinction between indirectly and directly
affected villages). Household respondents tended to feel more safe
in areas supposedly out of reach of armed groups than in villages
indirectly affected by armed groups (63% versus 48%) but the very
high proportion of respondents who felt unsafe in either area fur-
ther justified considering the whole study population as affected
by insecurity.
Table 10 shows that few household-level covariates predict the
likelihood to receive aid. Household heads who identified as work-
ers were more likely to receive GFD (but marginally less likely to
receive any form of aid) and households who dedicated a larger
share of their budget to food were less likely to participate in
school feeding programs. Households with higher value of assets
were also more likely to participate in school feeding programs.
Village-level covariates were more important in terms of allocation
of aid. Aid was less likely to be received in villages with access to a
nearby market (remote areas seem to have been prioritized), in vil-
lages perceived to be very unsafe at baseline (although this does
not have an effect on school feeding) and in villages where armedPlease cite this article in press as: Tranchant, J.-P., et al. The impact of food assis
experiment in Mali. World Development (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worldgroups were present (for GFD and school feeding). The likelihood of
receiving any aid or GFD was also lower in villages located in
regions where armed groups are present. Finally, the existence of
past development projects before the baseline explains the access
to food aid in subsequent years. Columns 4 and 5, which shows the
results of a multinomial logit regression of the number of forms of
aid received by the household, broadly confirms these findings.
Tables 11 and 12 show how balanced the covariates are before
and after weighting the treatment and control samples with the
estimated propensity score. Austin (2009) recognizes that stan-
dardized differences below 10% do not signal problematic imbal-
ances in the distribution of covariates. With this threshold in
mind, no less than seven covariates are imbalanced in the raw
sample for Any aid (column 1). In the weighted sample, however,
standardized differences are below 10% for all covariates. Similarly,
for GFD, SF and Number of types of aid (when equal to 1), the
imbalances in the raw sample are eliminated in the weighted sam-
ple (although the standardized difference for past safety is just 10%
for GFD). When number of types of aid equal 2, however, two
covariates remain imbalanced after the weighting. Specifically,
treated households are less likely to have access to a market withintance on food insecure populations during conflict: Evidence from a quasi-
dev.2018.01.027
Table 11
Standardized differences in raw and weighted samples.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample: Raw Weighted Raw Weighted Raw Weighted
Treatment: Any aid Any aid GFD GFD SF SF
Secondary school within 5 km 0.013 0.042 0.029 0.056 0.080 0.007
Market within 5 km 0.248 0.003 0.284 0.013 0.209 0.012
Past project 0.268 0.034 0.210 0.034 0.349 0.011
Very unsafe 0.127 0.030 0.230 0.10 0.100 0.004
Age household head 0.007 0.006 0.014 0.018 0.022 0.015
Expenditures per capita 0.073 0.007 0.160 0.022 0.073 0.017
Household size 0.009 0.029 0.128 0.036 0.068 0.013
Dependency ratio 0.053 0.002 0.010 0.014 0.121 0.029
food groups 0.002 0.0004 0.030 0.003 0.089 0.024
Polygamous 0.081 0.0098 0.126 0.023 0.044 0.0001
Worker 0.147 0.01 0.242 0.005 0.067 0.007
Land cultivated 0.018 0.026 0.119 0.003 0.197 0.022
1st quintile expenditures 0.084 0.011 0.123 0.008 0.076 0.017
2nd quintile expenditures 0.125 0.011 0.075 0.018 0.160 0.010
3rd quintile expenditures 0.104 0.015 0.016 0.002 0.291 0.005
4th quintile expenditures 0.060 0.014 0.066 0.012 0.008 0.010
Food % in budget 0.029 0.002 0.182 0.029 0.269 0.019
Logarithm of assets value 0.059 0.022 0.092 0.004 0.261 0.001
Armed groups in village 0.010 0.012 0.171 0.0002 0.293 0.004
Armed groups in region 0.181 0.001 0.221 0.012 0.172 0.002
Observations 1024 1024 1012 1012 1012 1012
Note: Numbers in bold indicate standardized difference above 10%.
GFD: General Food Distribution; TSF: Targeted Supplementary Feeding; SF: School Feeding.
Table 12
Standardized differences in raw and weighted samples for Types aid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Raw Weighted Raw Weighted
Number of types of aid 1 1 2 2
Secondary school within 5 km 0.074 0.024 0.040 0.067
Market within 5 km 0.181 0.005 0.472 0.193
Past project 0.147 0.027 0.356 0.023
Very unsafe 0.107 0.013 0.100 0.038
Age household head 0.049 0.001 0.035 0.001
Expenditures per capita 0.074 0.020 0.091 0.099
Household size 0.059 0.028 0.096 0.080
Dependency ratio 0.059 0.014 0.022 0.013
Food groups consumed 0.032 0.014 0.135 0.003
Polygamous household 0.058 0.009 0.188 0.126
Worker 0.149 0.026 0.221 0.030
Land cultivated 0.012 0.018 0.088 0.030
1st quintile expenditures 0.137 0.003 0.148 0.029
2nd quintile expenditures 0.133 0.016 0.078 0.019
3rd quintile expenditures 0.032 0.006 0.043 0.011
4th quintile expenditures 0.040 0.025 0.087 0.051
Food % in budget 0.002 0.011 0.014 0.043
Logarithm of assets value 0.029 0.014 0.017 0.063
Armed groups in village 0.087 0.019 0.088 0.059
Armed groups in region 0.081 0.005 0.107 0.055
Observations 1024 1024 1024 1024
Note: Numbers in bold indicate standardized difference above 10%.
J.-P. Tranchant et al. /World Development xxx (2018) xxx–xxx 135 km and they are less likely to be polygamous. Still, we have a
strong degree of confidence that the matched DID estimations
are able to eliminate observable sources of selection bias for each
treatment variable, at least for four out of five aid categories.
The impact estimates of the food assistance are summarized in
Table 13 for the full sample, showing evidence of some positive
impact of the food transfers during the study period on household
total expenditures and food expenditures. GFD was found to
increase total expenditures whereas school feeding and the combi-
nation of two forms of aid were found to increase food expendi-
tures. These effects are statistically significant at the 10% level. In
terms of total expenditures, the effect of the GFD was estimatedPlease cite this article in press as: Tranchant, J.-P., et al. The impact of food assis
experiment in Mali. World Development (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worldat 3208 CFA/month per AE, corresponding to an increase of 20%
from baseline. For food expenditures, the impact of school feeding
was 2364 CFA/month per AE, equivalent to an increase of 21% from
baseline values.
There were also positive effects on micro-nutrient availability
from household food consumption during the seven-day recall per-
iod. Households who received two forms of aid have seen a statis-
tically significant increase in their availability of calories, protein,
iron and vitamin A at the 5% or 10% levels. The magnitude of these
effects is very substantial, as it ranges from 29% of the baseline
value for calories to 50% of the baseline value for vitamin A. Con-
sumption of vitamin A also strongly increased for recipients oftance on food insecure populations during conflict: Evidence from a quasi-
dev.2018.01.027
Table 13
Estimations of the impact of food assistance on household food expenditures, food consumption and on children’s height.
Sample Full sample
Estimator Propensity score (kernel) matching difference-in-difference.
Food assistance Any aid GFD SF 1 Type of aid 2 types of aid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DMonthly expenditures (FCFA) 2332.37 3208.77* 2228.95 2159.05 2804.18
(1522.6) (1947.04) (1480.4) (1995.67) (2028.2)
[1970] [1973] [1962] [1968] [1649]
DMonthly food expenditures (FCFA) 1873.02 2680.5 2364.1* 1468.1 3108.3**
(1567.08) (1915.8) (1393.5) (2152.0) (1434.3)
[1971] [1974] [1963] [1969] [1646]
DFood expenditure as % of budget 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.015
(0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.026)
[1969] [1972] [1961] [1968] [1645]
DCalories (kcal) consumed daily 2979.5 4463.1 1390.9 4057.4 970.95*
(3515.6) (6211.8) (1285.1) (4633.7) (502.4)
[1996] [1998] [1987] [1994] [1674]
DProtein (gram) consumed daily 62.1 95.4 36.5 91.3 36.7**
(73.3) (108.3) (30.3) (112.15) (17.4)
[1979] [1982] [1971] [1978] [1650]
DIron (mg) consumed daily 16.7 25.9 9.0 23.4 7.73**
(21.5) (36.1) (8.0) (23.0) (3.67)
[1982] [1984] [1973] [1980] [1653]
DZinc (mg) consumed daily 40.6 59.2 13.57 53.3 7.08
(45.6) (91.2) (16.6) (53.3) (5.8)
[1992] [1994] [1983] [1990] [1664]
DVitamin A (mcg) consumed daily 128.4 168.4 270.3*** 88.3 247.04*
(84.5) (113.4) (82.9) (95.8) (147.7)
[1978] [1981] [1970] [1975] [1651]
DDietary diversity score 0.026 0.291 0.231 0.051 0.251
(0.157) (0.195) (0.252) (0.189) (0.274)
[2290] [2294] [2282] [2288] [1920]
DHeight (cm) 0.107 0.652 0.045 0.305 0.818
(1.444) (1.784) (1.529) (1.445) (3.201)
[1947] [1953] [1960] [1956] [1866]
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations in square brackets.
All expenses are scaled per adult equivalent (AE).
The variables ‘‘1 form” and ‘‘2 forms” refer to the number of forms of aid received by the household, as indicated by the Types of aid variables.
Estimations for Height restricted to children under 5 years of age at baseline.
Estimations exclude observations for which the change in the outcome variable is lower than the 2.5th percentile and above the 97.5th percentile of the distribution.
GFD: General Food Distribution; TSF: Targeted Supplementary Feeding; SF: School Feeding.
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ever, we found no effect of any forms of food assistance (when
received in isolation) on micro-nutrient availability. Finally, there
is no discernible impact of food assistance on children’s growth.7 Results not shown to save space but are available upon request.5. Estimating the impact of food aid allowing for heterogeneity
The treatment effects reported in Section 4 are estimated under
the assumption that the whole sample was affected by insecurity.
In what follows, we investigate whether stronger, or more direct,
exposure to armed conflict influences the impact of food assis-
tance. Specifically, we will estimate the impact on aid on three sub-
groups: (i) villages unaffected by the presence of armed groups, (ii)
villages indirectly affected by the presence of armed groups (they
were present in the region but not in the village), and (iii) villages
directly affected by the presence of armed groups.
The number of observations is small for estimations on the sub-
sample of directly affected villages. We have dropped from the
table of results all the estimations that were based on fewer than
30 observations in either the treatment or control group at baseline
and/or endline. This condition is always met on the subsamples of
unaffected and indirectly affected villages. For directly affected vil-
lages, however, the condition is systematically violated for school
feeding and when the number of types of aid equal 2. There were
also an insufficient number of observations to estimate the impact
of any treatment variable on children’s height.Please cite this article in press as: Tranchant, J.-P., et al. The impact of food assis
experiment in Mali. World Development (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worldTo ensure that the covariates are balanced in these subsamples,
we re-ran the estimation of the propensity score at the level of the
subgroups. Even within the three subgroups, the kernel propensity
score DID estimator is remarkably effective at balancing covariates
between treatment and control groups.7
Table 14 summarizes the impact estimates in the sub-sample
of the study population living in villages with no armed groups
in the region. Humanitarian aid in the form of SF had a positive
impact on food expenditures whereas GFD was found to increase
total food expenditures. These results are comparable in magni-
tude and statistical precision to those of Table 13. However, the
positive effects of aid on food consumption that we found for
the full sample are not present for the subsample of ‘conflict-
free’ villages, with the exception of vitamin A. Iron consumption
was even slightly lower for households receiving two forms of
aid than for others (p < 0:1). It is worth stressing that the coef-
ficients associated with food expenditures, calories and iron are
all negative in Table 14. The fact that receiving two forms of
aid is no longer positively associated with these variables in
the villages not affected by armed groups thus cannot be
explained by the lower sample size and statistical power. Other
variables of aid continued to be unrelated with micro-nutrient
availability (other than vitamin A) and height.tance on food insecure populations during conflict: Evidence from a quasi-
dev.2018.01.027
Table 14
Estimations of the impact of food assistance on households’ food expenditures, food consumption and children’s height in villages not affected by the conflict.
Sample No armed groups in the region
Estimator Propensity score (kernel) matching difference-in-difference.
Food assistance Any aid GFD SF 1 type of aid 2 types of aid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DMonthly expenditures (FCFA) 1716.8 3296.6* 2439.1 1372.7 999.0
(1538.4) (1957.6) (1806.03) (2013.4) (2682.2)
[718] [704] [721] [712] [658]
DMonthly food expenditures (FCFA) 916.9 1684.4 2375.4* 336.1 409.1
(1265.7) (1658.8) (1274.6) (1682.9) (2156.5)
[717] [699] [718] [708] [657]
DFood expenditure as % of budget 0.021 0.036 0.002 0.018 0.049
(0.026) (0.031) (0.038) (0.035) (0.045)
[711] [694] [714] [701] [653]
DCalories (kcal) consumed daily 9000.6 1300 26.1 1300 362.1
(7605.1) (1600) (368.0) (1200) (648.8)
[750] [684] [703] [692] [644]
DProtein (gram) consumed daily 205.3 289.1 2.6 288.5 19.3
(220.8) (297.9) (11.2) (321.8) (18.6)
[694] [676] [694] [684] [635]
DIron (mg) consumed daily 57.2 78.8 2.8 79.0 7.0*
(61.3) (76.7) (2.7) (79.1) (3.9)
[690] [674] [692] [680] [635]
DZinc (mg) consumed daily 120.7 167.8 5.75 168.06 8.7
(113.5) (166.4) (6.05) (148.8) (9.12)
[682] [665] [685] [672] [628]
DVitamin A (mcg) consumed daily 153.7 256.4* 275.8** 20.4 307.35***
(102.3) (148.9) (126.67) (89.13) (114.9)
[705] [689] [704] [698] [643]
DDietary diversity score 0.03 0.386 0.236 0.171 0.14
(0.247) (0.330) (0.413) (0.338) (0.466)
[806] [790] [810] [798] [744]
DHeight (cm) 2.222 3.813 1.302 0.837 5.609
(2.817) (2.798) (3.204) (2.215) (4.450)
[745] [669] [699] [706] [725]
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations in square brackets.
All expenses are scaled per adult equivalent (AE).
The variables ‘‘1 form” and ‘‘2 forms” refer to the number of forms of aid received by the household, as indicated by the Types of aid variables.
Estimations for Height restricted to children under 5 years of age at baseline.
Estimations exclude observations for which the change in the outcome variable is lower than the 2.5th percentile and above the 97.5th percentile of the distribution.
GFD: General Food Distribution; TSF: Targeted Supplementary Feeding; SF: School Feeding.
8 It is plausible that the smaller sample size in Table 16 explains the lack of
significant effects of food aid on vitamin A, iron and calories as the coefficients
associated with each of these variables are positive and similar in magnitude to the
corresponding coefficients in previous tables, where some of which were found to be
significantly different from zero number.
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the study population living in villages that were not directly
affected by the conflict but where armed groups were present in
the wider region. Total and food expenditures tended to be higher
for aid recipients than for other households, but the standard
errors of the estimates were quite large so that none of these
effects are statistically distinguishable from zero. Aid was however
responsible for a strong increase in food consumption. Households
receiving two forms of aid have seen their availability of calories,
protein, iron and zinc go up by 47%, 74%, 68% and 35% respectively.
These effects are statistically significant at the 1% level for protein,
at the 5% level for iron and at the 10% level for calories and zinc.
Furthermore, GFD was found to significantly increase caloric intake
by 52% (p < 0:05) and zinc consumption by 64% (p < 0:1) while
school feeding was found to increase vitamin A availability by
48% (p < 0:05).
Interestingly, the provision of two forms of aid increased the
height of children aged 2–5 years at baseline by approximately 7
cm in the intervention households compared to controls, equiva-
lent to an increase of about 8% from baseline.
Table 16 displays the impact estimates in the sub-sample of the
study population living in villages with armed groups present. A
significant positive impact was identified on food expenditures in
households receiving any aid, GFD, or one form of aid, with effects
sizes of substantively larger magnitude compared to those
observed in the full sample. Consumption of zinc was alsoPlease cite this article in press as: Tranchant, J.-P., et al. The impact of food assis
experiment in Mali. World Development (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worldsignificantly increased for recipients of any food aid (or one form
of aid). No statistically significant results were found for the other
outcomes, including availability of vitamin A.86. Discussion and conclusions
In this study we examined new survey data to assess the impact
of humanitarian aid on food security and nutrition outcomes dur-
ing conflict in Northern Mali. The survey data showed that during
the five years since the conflict escalated, households experienced
continued food insecurity, as evidenced by the modest increases in
average expenditures per adult equivalent (less than FCFA 1220
over the whole period, corresponding to less than a 1% increase),
as well as decreases in overall food consumption and micro-
nutrient availability.
The survey data also highlighted the extent and intensity of
conflict exposure in the study population. Over one in five house-
holds in our study were exposed to violence linked to the presence
of armed groups, including episodes of banditry, terrorist/armed
attacks, political violence, kidnappings, and destruction oftance on food insecure populations during conflict: Evidence from a quasi-
dev.2018.01.027
Table 15
Estimations of the impact of food assistance on households’ food expenditures, food consumption and children anthropometry in villages indirectly affected by the conflict.
Sample Armed groups in the region but not in the village.
Estimator Propensity score (kernel) matching difference-in-difference.
Food assistance Any aid GFD SF 1 type of aid 2 types of aid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DMonthly expenditures (FCFA) 1253.4 2762.5 229.6 1139.75 3100.8
(2733.7) (4181.1) (2528.7) (3938.15) (2361.9)
[1036] [1021] [981] [1032] [764]
DMonthly food expenditures (FCFA) 654.5 1498.2 714.8 226.9 2839.28
(2847.8) (3872.12) (2810.4) (3713.4) (1767.8)
[1036] [1019] [980] [1032] [763]
DFood expenditure as % of budget 0.001 0.002 0.025 0.009 0.016
(0.024) (0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.039)
[1043] [1028] [981] [1038] [770]
DCalories (kcal) consumed daily 554.13 1737.4** 51.17 378.5 1572.5*
(704.6) (699.44) (800.12) (848.7) (875.1)
[1066] [1050] [1004] [1061] [795]
DProtein (gram) consumed daily 15.1 35.9 11.86 3.2 72.04***
(25.1) (32.04) (27.3) (28.09) (27.5)
[1062] [1046] [998] [1057] [785]
DIron (mg) consumed daily 6.42 11.76* 3.23 4.25 15.76**
(6.06) (1.74) (5.3) (5.39) (6.4)
[1064] [1049] [1003] [1059] [791]
DZinc (mg) consumed daily 6.09 20.78* 3.33 4.94 12.03*
(9.2) (10.74) (11.9) (8.73) (7.23)
[1083] [1064] [1014] [1077] [805]
DVitamin A (mcg) consumed daily 1.115 184.7 240.4** 13.35 38.0
(117.93) (180.4) (114.7) (158.3) (196.38)
[1066] [1049] [1005] [1059] [801]
DDietary diversity score 0.179 0.004 0.326 0.04 0.904*
(0.230) (0.355) (0.357) (0.28) (0.498)
[1238] [1218] [1164] [1230] [924]
DHeight (cm) 2.265 3.273 0.070 0.829 7.244***
(1.791) (2.286) (1.842) (1.645) (2.661)
[1002] [979] [965] [1006] [961]
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations in square brackets.
All expenses are scaled per adult equivalent (AE).
The variables ‘‘1 form” and ‘‘2 forms” refer to the number of forms of aid received by the household, as indicated by the Types of aid variables.
Estimations for Height restricted to children under 5 years of age at baseline.
Estimations exclude observations for which the change in the outcome variable is lower than the 2.5th percentile and above the 97.5th percentile of the distribution.
GFD: General Food Distribution; TSF: Targeted Supplementary Feeding; SF: School Feeding.
16 J.-P. Tranchant et al. /World Development xxx (2018) xxx–xxxinfrastructure, amongst others. Out of the 68 villages included in
the survey, 11 (16%) were still experiencing the presence of armed
groups at the time of the follow-up survey, with most these report-
ing that the presence of armed groups had persisted following the
coup in 2012. Only three of the 55 villages without presence of
armed groups during the follow-up survey had experienced their
presence since 2012. These groups were violent and were per-
ceived as threatening by the population. The data also indicated
that the presence of armed groups overlapped with conflict-
related violence, as well as with fear and reduced mobility in the
communities, including visits to farms, markets, health centers
and schools. These findings confirm the potential for conflict to
indirectly affect household’s food security through a range of dif-
ferent channels.
The household and village surveys suggested that a range of
humanitarian aid had been scaled-up in the study areas during
the five-year period following the 2012 coup, including food assis-
tance in the form of GFD, SF, and other modalities. Of the different
forms of aid, GFD was more common, followed by SF. The coverage
of TSF (targeted supplementary feeding), a key intervention to pre-
vent and treat acute malnutrition, was extremely low in the study
population. However, survey data also indicates that access to aid
tended to decrease as proximity with armed groups increased, as
highlighted by the higher likelihood for conflict-affected house-
holds to live in villages without any access to aid, and a lower like-
lihood to live in villages with one form of food assistance, though
this relationship was not as marked at the household level. ThesePlease cite this article in press as: Tranchant, J.-P., et al. The impact of food assis
experiment in Mali. World Development (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worldfindings suggest that the logistics of safely scaling-up aid in conflict
areas may override the necessity to reach most vulnerable
populations.
The analysis of treatment effects suggests that the scaling-up of
humanitarian aid by WFP and development partners in Mali had
important positive impacts on the food security targeted popula-
tion. We find evidence of protective effects on household total
expenditures and food expenditures, as well as on micro-nutrient
availability, food consumption and on changes in height in children
aged to 2–5 years at baseline. The effects on food consumption are
comparable with those in the literature on social assistance. A
recent meta-analysis of social assistance programs including 48
studies of 39 social protection programs found that transfers
increase monthly food expenditure by 17% on average, compared
to the 21% estimate found in our study (Hidrobo et al., 2018).
Our analysis identified a large protective effect of aid on food
consumption and on the height of children in the cohort aged
2–5 at baseline (of the order of 0.5 SDs), where armed groups were
present near the targeted communities, though not present in the
communities themselves. The effect was concentrated on house-
holds receiving at least two forms of aid (usually GFD with school
feeding). This finding suggests that food assistance may provide a
platform to improve children’s growth outside the priority age
group for nutrition interventions during the first 1000 days. This
finding is also consistent with the idea that the provision of house-
hold food transfers, or GFD alone without specific complementary
foods targeting young children, generally does not result intance on food insecure populations during conflict: Evidence from a quasi-
dev.2018.01.027
Table 16
Estimations of the impact of food assistance on households’ food expenditures, food consumption and children anthropometry in villages directly affected by the conflict.
Sample Armed groups in the village.
Estimator Propensity score (kernel) matching difference-in-difference.
Food assistance Any aid GFD SF 1 type of aid 2 types of aid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DMonthly expenditures (FCFA) 7478.9 7191.2 . 5946.3 .
(4887.3) (4590.3) . (3742.8) .
[220] [216] [43] [208] [45]
DMonthly food expenditures (FCFA) 8639.6*** 7907.1** . 6197.5** .
(3312.7) (3616.6) . (3217.2) .
[223] [219] [42] [210] [46]
DFood expenditure as % of budget 0.022 0.013 . 0.003 .
(0.06) (0.073) . (0.061) .
[214] [211] [41] [200] [49]
DCalories (kcal) consumed daily 2474.7 2387.5 . 1758.0 .
(1848.8) (1725.2) . (1194.2) .
[223] [218] [41] [209] [46]
DProtein (gram) consumed daily 135.7 140.3 . 102.7 .
(93.8) (97.5) . (66.65) .
[224] [219] [42] [209] [48]
DIron (mg) consumed daily 35.02 35.27 . 26.05 .
(24.86) (26.94) . (17.8) .
[223] [218] [41] [210] [47]
DZinc (mg) consumed daily 34.15* 32.15 . 26.71* .
(17.9) (19.6) . (13.84) .
[223] [218] [42] [209] [46]
DVitamin A (mcg) consumed daily 522.2 230.5 . 349.6 .
(471.8) (311.17) . (280.9) .
[205] [202] [38] [194] [44]
DDietary diversity score 0.203 0.226 . 0.122 .
(0.621) (0.549) . (0.605) .
[242] [238] [44] [226] [54]
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations in square brackets.
All expenses are scaled per adult equivalent (AE).
The variables ‘‘1 form” and ‘‘2 forms” refer to the number of forms of aid received by the household, as indicated by the Types of aid variables.
Estimations for Height restricted to children under 5 years of age at baseline.
Estimations exclude observations for which the change in the outcome variable is lower than the 2.5th percentile and above the 97.5th percentile of the distribution.
GFD: General Food Distribution; TSF: Targeted Supplementary Feeding; SF: School Feeding.
J.-P. Tranchant et al. /World Development xxx (2018) xxx–xxx 17improvements on nutrition outcomes of young children (Ruel et al.,
2013).
In conclusion, in settings characterized by chronic food insecu-
rity and conflict, food transfers may have a protective effect on
food security of vulnerable populations. Evidence from this study
suggests that there is scope to improve the design and scale-up
of humanitarian aid interventions during conflict, including pro-
viding increased coverage of nutrition specific interventions, or of
the provision of specialized complementary foods alongside foods
provided to households as part of general food distribution, for
example. However, humanitarian operations during conflict face
important trade-offs involving on the one hand program scale
and effectiveness, and on the other the practicalities of operating
in areas under the control of armed groups, including security,
governance and transparency.Conflict of interest
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